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Abstract 
 
The article illuminates the dynamics of bilateral cross-border cooperation between two 
vastly different legal-administrative partners. The analysis utilizes empirical findings of 
a case study on bilateral Finnish-Russian crime prevention cooperation. Currently, both 
the differences in national legislations and the fast-changing administrative environment 
make this cooperation challenging. The case study showed that bilateral cooperation, 
which is the dominant form of cooperation between EU member states and Russia, is 
currently affected by disjointed and even competing multilateral and bilateral structures, 
differences in criminal law and procedure, gaps between international treaties and 
national legislation, local and regional variation in practices, weak institutional trust and 
abrupt policy changes. The results indicate that the effectiveness of cross-border 
networks cannot be assessed strictly in terms of quantitative outcomes. Further long-
term development of cooperation requires both realistic understanding of legal-
administrative constraints and strong commitment at the national and supranational 
political levels.  
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Introduction 
Today cross-border cooperation requires strong institutional trust between different 
administrative and legal cultures. Modern security strategies stress proactive measures 
(see Tholen, 2010: 268) at  global (Cope et al., 1997), regional and national levels (see 
Bowling, 2009). A key area of this evolution has been cooperation in combatting cross-
border crime (Alain, 2001; Benyon, 1994; Block, 2008; den Boer, 2002; Gill, 2006; 
Sheptycki, 2002, Hills, 2009; Nohrstedt and Hansen, 2009; Sheptycki, 2002).  
Cross-border cooperation requires that clear jurisdictions are complemented by 
networks and diffuse geographical borders (Buzan, 1991; Sheptycki, 2002) which 
include political, technical and operative questions at different administrative levels 
(Alain 2001; Benyon 1994; Niemenkari, 2003). Macro-level governmental questions 
involve constitutional and international legal agreements and the harmonization of 
national laws and regulations. The organizational meso-level sets up specialist 
organizations and joint databases and coordinates activities. The micro-level involves 
the actual investigation of specific offences and the prevention and control of particular 
forms of crime. The challenge is to create a coherent and strategically well-planned 
system which is based on the practical needs of professionals (Gerspacher and Dupont 
2007; Jones 2008).  
To advance this development, cooperation in the EU has included the founding of joint 
organizations such as Europol (1999) and Eurojust (2002), the creation of legal 
instruments such as the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and the Treaty on Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, the development of exchanges and the joint education 
of officials. The border, police, customs, visa and justice authorities of Schengen Treaty 
countries jointly use the Schengen Information System (SIS). In connection with this 
internal structural harmonization, the EU has developed its interaction with third parties, 
of which the Russian Federation has been the most important. The Cooperation 
Agreement between the Russian Federation and Europol (2003) covers eight types of 
offence and involves the exchange of strategic and technical information, experience 
and best practices, legislative acts and other professional material, as well as various 
types of meetings. The Russian Ministry of the Interior is the principal authority, with a 
National Contact Point. Russia participates in Europol’s analytical activities, providing 
regular information on organized crime and international terrorism.  
Even as the political goal before the crisis of 2014 was to create a visa-free area 
between EU and Russia, the cooperation lacked true operative effectiveness (Block 
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2008). In the future, European law enforcement agencies will attempt to work as a more 
unified system in their cooperation with the Russian Federation, which will require 
more detailed attention to administrative and legal differences. Researchers have 
underlined the fact that Russian institutions recycle the unofficial practices of the Soviet 
system and modernization efforts are superficial (see Brovkin, 2002; Gelman and 
Starodubsev, 2014; Gilinskyi, 2006; Goncharov and Shirikov, 2013; Ledyayev, 2009; 
Oleinik, 2009). We have wanted to look beyond the explanations of path dependency 
(see Meyer-Sahling, 2009). We have sought answers to the question of how the 
structural arrangements of the cooperation and the administrative environment where 
this cooperation takes place affect actual operative police work. Our hypothesis has 
been that the environment has a dominating effect on the current cooperation. At the 
same time, we claim that legal and administrative questions in EU-Russia bilateral 
cross-border cooperation have not been studied in a manner where legal and 
administrative differences  (see Ziller, 2005) are clearly defined and their impact 
evaluated. This results in structural differences being given political or cultural 
explanations, while real cultural differences in law and organizations are not given the 
kind of informed attention they deserve.  
Cross-border cooperation depends on stable and transparent practices which should  not 
be primarily based on personal relations, but instead on legal norms and official 
channels of assistance. The current administrative environment in the Finnish-Russian 
case, however, has elements which we call a ‘risk administration’ (Heusala, 2005; c.f. 
Beck, 1992). This refers to a public administration whose core cultural values are 
undergoing a major transformation. Changes produce risks, such as incoherent planning, 
diffuse leadership, administrative cliques and corruption (Heusala 2005: 45-48). In the 
legal sphere, transformation happens in the positivist law at three levels (e.g. Tuori, 
2000: 217-229) which are all affected by elements of a ‘risk administration’. On the 
surface level, which consists of legislation, formal court practice and legal science, 
changes can be fast. In the middle level, which includes legal concepts, legal principles, 
and the doctrine of the legal sources, change typically takes a longer time.  In the inner 
level, the ‘deep structure’ of the legal system, the principles and conceptions of 
fundamental rights in a society, may take generations to truly change. 
We have examined how these features affect cross-border cooperation in the work of 
police liaison officers. Our case, based on new empirical material, is the Finnish-
Russian cooperation which has been developing for the past 20 years. This cooperation, 
which is one of the most active in Europe, is based on the treaties of the Council of 
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Europe and the European Union and the bilateral treaties between its member states and 
the Russian Federation. The most important tool for the preliminary investigation is the 
bilateral government level Treaty on Crime Prevention (1993). The Finnish liaison 
officers work at the heart of the cross-border crime investigation. Even as the current 
political crisis has paralysed governmental contacts, the face-to-face operative work has 
continued.  The results of our analysis are meant to offer tools for the future 
development of this cooperation at both the bilateral and EU-Russia levels.  
The research design and analysis 
Finnish liaison officers represent the Finnish central authority (National Bureau of 
Investigation) in Russia and facilitate Finnish analytical and criminal intelligence work 
in cooperation with the Russian authorities. Their daily work consists of supporting 
police operations by delivering official requests for assistance and facilitating their 
progression. In 2015 Finland has six police liaison officers in Russia, of whom two  
work part-time in Murmansk and Petrozavodsk, three  work full-time in St. Petersburg 
and one in Moscow. The general forms and practices of cooperation have remained the 
same since the time of our interviews.   
The new empirical material was collected in Finland in 2011 through qualitative theme 
interviews with 12 experienced police officers who were involved in cross-border 
cooperation in Finland and Russia. The target group members were interviewed face-to-
face by the authors for 1-2 hours each with the intention of shedding light on the 
experiences of the interviewed persons. The interviews and other material collection 
techniques were structured around three themes: (1) legal structures of the cooperation 
(international treaties and national legislation), (2) implementation and results of the 
cooperation (stability and quality of assistance, information flows between partners, 
coordination and effectiveness of cooperation), and (3) the administrative environment 
of the cooperation (interpretations of legal instruments, structures of authorities, 
intercultural communication and trust, professionalism, planning and guidance of 
international cooperation).  We covered the national, organizational and individual 
levels in our questions. The interview material was analysed using of qualitative text 
analysis by way of information clustering. The concepts which were produced through 
the clustering process were grouped under the original three main themes. Analytical 
generalizations were made based on this material.  
Written material included the contractual basis of cooperation and information collected 
from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) about the history of liaison officer 
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work in the Russian Federation. Finnish and Russian legislation and their interpretative 
sources, as well as Criminal investigation protocols from the NBI organized crime 
investigation unit (Nro 2400/R/477/06 and Nro 2400/R/124/07),  were also utilized. An 
essential part of our effort was to raise questions about legal challenges. (Jansen 2006, 
306-307, 336; Örucu 2004, 11, 34) Our comparison concentrates on the differences of 
pre-trial investigation and the position of suspects in the various stages of this 
investigation.  
Legal norms in parallel criminal investigations  
Among their other tasks, the Finnish liaison officers in Russia operate as coordinators of 
parallel criminal investigations by two or more countries. This involves the facilitation 
of information exchange and finding the appropriate contact persons for cooperation, as 
well as making decisions about where charges are going to be pressed and which 
information can be utilized in the subsequent court process.  In the work of the liaison 
officers, main legal challenges are connected with differences both in the jurisdictions 
of authorities and in the phases of criminal investigation.  
Cooperation between Russia and EU countries has to a large extent depended on 
bilateral treaties (Block, 2008: 74). The Finnish-Russian law enforcement cooperation is 
based on the Treaty on Crime Prevention Cooperation between the governments of 
Finland and the Russian Federation (1993) and the European Convention (hereafter EC) 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959). The bilateral treaty guarantees direct 
contacts between local and regional law enforcement officials and is useful in the 
operative exchange of information, particularly in the intelligence-gathering phase, 
although it needs to be complemented with the use of the EC of 1959.  It gives the 
authorities the right to provide assistance in interviews (interrogations), accumulation of 
evidence, clarification of identity, search for missing persons, confiscation of property, 
attainment of documents, and exchange of information concerning these matters.   
In the bilateral treaty, the Finnish central authority is the National Bureau of 
Investigation and the competent parties are the Police, the Finnish Border Guard and 
Customs.  Russia has four central authorities: the Office of the Prosecutor General of 
the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Customs Service 
and the Federal Security Service  (FSB). The Russian competent parties are the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, Federal Security Service (FSB), Narcotics Control Agency, Anti-
Money Laundering Agency, Customs, Head Prosecutor´s Office and Federal Committee 
of Investigation.  
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The different jurisdictions of the competent authorities set limitations to cross-border 
cooperation. The Finnish system of pre-trial investigation is led by the Police, although 
in specific types of crime, the Border Guard and Customs have full investigative 
competence. In Russia, however, the jurisdictions of the authorities have changed 
several times during the current Codex of Criminal Process (Ugolovno-protsessual´nyi 
kodeks RF (18 December 2001) No. 174-F3, SZ RF (2001) No. 52 with changes) and 
the Russian law has two forms of investigation: comprehensive pre-trial investigation 
and so-called limited investigation. The form of an investigation depends on the 
seriousness of the crime. The authorities for a comprehensive pre-trial investigation 
include the Federal Investigation Committee, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Drug Control Service. Search and 
intelligence-gathering is conducted by the authorities of the Ministry of the Interior, 
FSB, and Federal Drug Control Service. Criminal intelligence-gathering is also carried 
out by federal security organizations, Customs, foreign intelligence and prison 
authorities.   
The investigation of petty offences is based on the law on administrative offences - a 
hybrid law lying between the purely administrative and criminal laws (Koistinen, 2012: 
100-110). The Customs of the Russian Federation can currently conduct only 
investigations on administrative offences and criminal offences restricted to evasion of 
customs payments and smuggling cash money which prevents full cooperation with the 
Finnish Customs in pre-trial investigation of drug related crimes.   
Legal differences in the launching of a criminal investigation (or the opening of a 
criminal case) have a significant impact on the way that parallel investigations are 
carried out.  According to the Finnish Pre-trial Investigation Act (Section 3 of Chapter 
3) the criminal investigation authority should conduct an investigation when “there is 
reason to suspect” that an offence has been committed. In the Russian Criminal 
Procedure Code (Section 140) the grounds for the institution of a criminal case, i.e. 
launching a criminal investigation are “the existence of sufficient data, pointing to the 
elements of a crime”. As the “existence of sufficient data” (Russia) requires more 
information on a suspected crime than “reason to suspect” (Finland), the Finnish 
authorities reach the actual threshold of a criminal investigation earlier than their 
Russian counterparts.      
This leads to the next procedural difference which concerns intelligence gathering for 
evidence. Unlike the Finnish Police, the Russian Police do not automatically register a 
reported crime, but begin a so-called inspection phase (Vagin and Isitsenko, 2004) to 
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uncover whether there exists sufficient evidence of a crime.  This phase was originally 
created in the Soviet times to guarantee the constitutional rights of the parties to the 
criminal investigation, but today its purpose seems less clear. Undercover operations 
based on the Operative Investigation Activity Act (Federalnyi zakon ot 12.08.1995 
No:144-FZ “Ob operativno-rozysknoi dejatelnosti”) can be used by the Russian 
authorities quite freely in questioning, document search, and obtaining reference 
samples. The Russian authorities may, for instance, request a seizure of documents from 
a Finnish company during their inspection phase, a request which is only possible in 
Finland during the pre-trial investigation. Russian scholars have stated that the 
inspection phase is in fact a criminal investigation (Bezlepkin, 2004: 209), even though 
it does not result in the gathering of a full body of evidence (Ryžakov, 2011: 21). For 
national court procedures, the Finnish Police have to use the EC of 1959 to acquire any 
data (intelligence information) gathered during the Russian inspection phase.   
“In criminal investigations the Russian authorities immediately use information 
provided by informants or gathered with the help of covert methods.” i 
“The threshold for launching or opening the criminal case is much higher in 
Russia than in Finland, where it is very low. The Russian authority conducts a 
so-called inspection of facts before launching a criminal investigation. The 
inspection phase is carried out at the same time as the Finnish authority is 
already conducting their pre-trial investigation. In practice it has been common 
to carry out parallel investigations - the Russian authorities conduct their 
inspection before opening the criminal case, while the Finnish authorities are 
already conducting their pre-trial investigation. Furthermore, the material 
gathered by the Russian authorities has to be ‘legalized’, which means that a 
criminal case will be opened in Russia and the material [of the inspection] 
becomes a part of that criminal case.”  
Coordination of parallel investigations is affected by both the legal position of possible 
perpetrators and the investigation procedures. Finnish law uses the term ‘a suspect of a 
crime’ until the end of the pre-trial investigation, while in Russian pre-trial investigation 
a possible perpetrator is called ‘an accused of a crime’. The threshold for pre-trial 
investigation in Russia seems to correspond with the Finnish indictment.  The Russian 
investigator carries out the same tasks during the pre-trial investigation as the Finnish 
prosecutor carries out after the pre-trial investigation. The Finnish pre-trial investigation 
(Criminal Investigation Act, Chapter 2 of Section 10) intends to find out if there are 
probable causes for prosecution (Criminal Procedure Act, Chapter 6 of Section 1) and it 
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leads to a protocol of the investigation which the prosecutor uses as a basis for an 
indictment.  In Russia, the investigator presses the charges at the beginning of the pre-
trial investigation (Criminal Procedural Code, Section 172).  The Finnish prosecutor 
may take several months to reach a conclusion, while the Russian prosecutor has exactly 
10 days to make a final decision (a legal evaluation) on the case fter the investigator has 
delivered the indictment (Criminal Procedural Code, Section 221).   
“Problems have occurred with the application of the EC [of 1959], especially in 
cases, when the Finnish authorities request the Russian authorities to interview a 
Russian citizen as ‘a suspect of a crime'. For the Russian party, the interview is 
possible only when a parallel criminal investigation has been launched in 
Russia.”  
In addition to these practical differences in procedures and jurisdictions, the wide legal 
powers of the Russian authorities raise questions with regard to the still strong Soviet-
era practices and ways of thinking (e.g., Radtsenko et al., 2010: 7–9). For instance, 
criminal investigations which do not lead to an indictment can lead to a complaint about 
the investigator.  These differences between the Finnish and Russian norms and legal 
thinking can also be evaluated with the help of the rulings of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) (Van der Vet 2014a). The rulings are related to core areas of the 
Convention, which are the right to a fair trial (Russia 654 - Finland 37), the right to 
liberty and security (Russia 605 - Finland 2), inhuman or degrading treatment (Russia 
504 - Finland 1), the protection of property (Russia 501 - Finland 2), the right to an 
effective remedy (Russia 368 - Finland 10).ii By January 2013, 28,600 Russian 
applications were pending before the ECHR (Van der Vet 2014b).  
Differences in the core values of the legal system must be acknowledged in the further 
development of the legal basis of cooperation. The national legal provisions and 
discretion to rules stand out as questions which require close attention in bilateral 
cooperation.  Although legal harmonization seems unlikely at the moment, in the longer 
run, the joint commitment to overcome differences should be reinforced.   
Effectiveness of joint structures  
In the European Union member states, joint investigation teams have had a significant 
effect on the effectiveness of legal assistance. Finland and Russia, however, have not 
ratified the additional Protocol of the European Agreement on Legal Assistance (CETS 
182).  Because of this, the harmonization of bilateral treaties and joint structures with all 
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relevant Russian authorities is important. Additional agreements, for instance on 
comparisons of drug samples, should have a similar effect. As a result of 20 years of 
local, organizational and regional arrangements between the Finnish and Russian 
parties, strategic decision-making about the development of the cooperation has become 
a complex task. The interviews revealed a need for more comprehensive and detailed 
bilateral and European cooperation agreements which could be politically supported by 
both sides, as well as support for ground-level operative work in the national strategic-
level planning. Coordination of cross-border activities is important because the on-
going Russian reforms and changes of key personnel have weakened systematic 
commitment on both sides of the border. 
“It is vital to integrate Russia into EU structures to create functional cooperation, 
for instance in Europol. However, not all EU member states see Russia as an 
important factor for the development of their work. Currently, we have no 
cooperation between liaison officers from other EU member states in Russia”.  
 “It is important that the basis of contracts covers all types and levels of 
activities.” 
“The Russian changes are so hectic that [Finnish Police] chiefs do not 
necessarily have an up-to-date understanding about what type of support they 
should give us.” 
Finnish liaison officers concentrate on working with the North-Western branch of the 
Federal Drug Control Service. The interviews revealed that the FSB, which has an 
official task to act as the coordinator of security policy implementation (RF Federal’nyi 
Zakon “O bezopasnosti” (28 December 2010) No.390-FZ), has become more prominent 
in international contacts. The Russian side has increasingly underlined equality and 
precision in the implementation of international treaties in recent years. The respondents 
emphasized the positive developments in the speed and extent of information exchanges 
during the duration of the bilateral treaty (1994). The Russian authorities have been 
more active in making official requests, but the Finnish respondents felt that these 
requests often included limited information or requests which were not connected with 
specific criminal cases. The Finnish Police, on the other hand, often refrain from 
making requests because they feel that this is complicated and time-consuming.  
“If a Finnish Police officer asks for somebody´s telephone number from a 
Russian official, it takes two weeks to get an answer. So our work is slowed 
down because of such situations.” 
FINAL DRAFT                                                                                                                                                          
Article published in International Review of Administrative Sciences, vol. 84, number 2, June 2018 
  
 
10 
 
“Getting an authorization for mundane things varies from situation to situation. 
The [Russian] answer may be such as ‘We have an answer for you, but we are 
processing it’.”  
Even though the Finnish liaison officers were experienced in serious crime 
investigations, their 2 to 5 year rotation negatively affects organizational learning. The 
orientation of new liaison officers is mostly done on the job by colleagues. Finnish 
investigations would benefit if analysis and exchanges of information evolved from 
case-based work towards a more comprehensive reporting on the forms of cooperation 
and the Russian environment. The respondents felt that they should also receive more 
feedback from their Russian counterparts. Cooperation has evolved in a piecemeal 
manner through a ‘learning by doing’ method over the years, and governmental level 
and organizational strategic level contacts with Russian authorities were typically 
cautious and formal.    
 “In the 90s we met the Russian authorities once a month and gave a response to 
them the next month. At the beginning of the 2000s, our cooperation became 
consolidated; new contact persons began to take care of the cooperation. Since 
2008, the Russians have started to give us feedback on the effectiveness of 
operative assistance. But still, we have a long way to go towards a fast exchange 
of information.” 
“Cooperation depends on Russia. We should support their commitment, but we 
do not have the tools.” 
“The more we cooperate, the more high class information we get from Russia. 
But the Finnish Police are still quite ignorant about the Russian authorities.” 
“The indicators used in the measurement of effectiveness [in the Finnish Police] 
create pseudo-activities and distorted goals. For instance, confiscations are 
highly valued in drug-related crime prevention, while halting smuggling or 
uncovering smuggling channels gets less attention.” 
Both the dialogue with Russia and the decision-making about cooperation in Finland 
would benefit from better processing of information and experience gained in the 
operative work in Russia, coordination of goal setting and following up of results at 
different administrative levels. More thorough training of new liaison officers about the 
Russian administrative and legal environment also stands out as important.  If the 
intention in the longer run is to gradually replace the current parallel case-by-case 
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investigations by joint investigation teams, the previously mentioned measures should 
be combined with a joint system to analyse the effectiveness of official requests for 
legal assistance.  
The administrative environment of cooperation 
In Russia, the last 20-plus years have been marked by several major legislative changes 
(Kahn, 2008),  which have had a considerable effect on cross-border cooperation. The 
new Criminal Code came into force in 1997 and the Criminal Procedural Code in 2002. 
These continue to be amended. The creation of security policies culminated in the 2009 
National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (Strategia natsionalnoi 
bezopasnosti Rossijskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda, 12.5.2009, No 537). The strategy was 
updated with a presidential decree in the end of 2015 (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoi 
Federatsii, 31 December 2015, Nro 683 “O Strategii natsional´noi bezopasnosti 
Rossijskoi Federatsii”). The new law on the Police (Federalnyj zakon ot 07.02.2011 N3-
FZ “O politsii”) started a much waited for and subsequently heavily criticized 
programme of the comprehensive overhaul of the Russian police. The on-going police 
reform aims to set professional standards for police work and to ‘cleanse’ the police 
administration of corrupt practices. The latest reform is by no means the first of its kind, 
but instead follows a series of reforms which were conducted in the 2000s in the 
Ministry of the Interior (see Renz, 2011). 
Russian reforms have used the vehicles of administrative mergers, re-divisions and the 
creation of new administrative organizations (such as the Border Guard Service and the 
Narcotics Control Agency). The current changes originated from President Putin’s 
decision in 2000 to create seven federal districts which included functions of the 
Internal Ministry and the Prosecutor. Simultaneously, the Federal Tax Police and the 
Migration service were incorporated into the Internal Ministry and the correctional 
services into the Ministry of Justice. Important changes have taken place in the 
prosecutor´s position and serious crimes investigations. Prosecutors no longer have the 
right to arrest persons, nor can they launch an investigation, take part in the 
investigation, or order others to carry them out. The establishment of the Federal Drug 
Control Service (2003) consolidated investigations on organized drug-related crimes 
(Renz, 2011).   
The organization of the police has also undergone various changes from 
decentralization to the current re-centralization. In the old law, the public order and 
safety policing were a part of the subjects´ administration, meaning that the regional 
FINAL DRAFT                                                                                                                                                          
Article published in International Review of Administrative Sciences, vol. 84, number 2, June 2018 
  
 
12 
 
police chiefs were dependent on the central government while local police units were 
dependent on local governments. (Beck and Robertson, 2009; Heusala et al., 2009: 
111). The constant re-organizations have destabilized police work and also led to 
commercialized policing. This means not only legitimate public-private partnerships 
(Favarel-Garigues, 2004: 20) but also unofficial charity from business organizations and 
‘ordered investigations’ (zakaznye dela) (Salomon, 2005: 233). The ongoing reform 
seems to want to tackle the use of various forms of corrupt practices (Hensell, 2012)  
but its unintended side-effect of  is a ‘securitization’ of administrative decision making 
processes (Heusala, 2013) which slows down coordination and organizational learning 
at the regional and local levels. Still, the respondents of our interviews welcomed the 
reform:  
“There is money for development, both in the Ministry of Interior and in the 
Drug Control Service, the Russians have told us.” 
“Our cooperation is best with the Federal Drug Control Service. The FSB is 
active in everything, in the sense that it controls technical surveillance and many 
other practical matters.” 
The structural arrangements on the Russian side have made cooperation a complex 
matrix. Regional variations in activeness characterize cooperation.  From the Finnish 
perspective, both institutional trust and coordination among the Russian authorities is 
still far below the ideals of effective proactive policing. Explanations for this can be 
found in a number of areas, most of which are not predominantly specific to Russia, 
such as jurisdictions, effectiveness criteria, security classifications, resource competition 
between organizations and career development. Lack of coordination can also be 
attributed to the claimed existence of corruption and other unofficial mechanisms of 
influence in the Russian security administration. (see Gilinskiy, 2006; Zernova, 2011: 
6;).  
“The Russian authorities guard their territories. They don’t give anything to 
others [authorities].” 
“In the Drug Control Service in St. Petersburg cooperation with Finland is done 
by approximately 10 persons. In other words, we cooperate with people, not 
with an organization.”  
“Territorial disputes between Russian authorities can be felt locally as well.” 
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To a large extent, Finnish-Russian cooperation at the practical level is based on informal 
cross-border contacts (see Block, 2008) and is dependent on the volatile commitment of 
the Russian organizations. This short-term results-orientated approach is susceptible to 
personnel changes. The development of work does not evolve from case-based 
arrangements to a more comprehensive assessment of the investigation process. 
Adjusting to administrative and legal changes is a repeated challenge to ‘reinvent the 
wheel’ for both the Finnish and Russian partners. Instead of projecting positive 
organizational learning to their home institutions, the Russian partners needed to 
consume time and energy on the ‘inner games’ of their own organizations, particularly 
with regard to safeguarding their investigations from corruption-related information 
leaks.   
In spite of these elements, the Finnish liaison officers expressed strong collegial 
sympathy and willingness for goal-orientated practical action and better coordination 
across the border.  This general attitude is not affected by allegations or experiences of 
ethical problems in Russian law enforcements agencies. Paradoxically, the weak 
credibility of the Russian police in the courts requires Russian investigators to carry out 
their work diligently. Their Finnish colleagues did not raise any suspicions of 
prosecution quotas or systematic forgery of evidence. This critique has been raised by  
research on the Russian police, which has shown that Soviet-era thinking on efficiency 
has a considerable effect on  officers. Paneyakh (2013: 177) has pointed out that the 
Russian Police still have institutional autonomy, which flows from centralization, little 
feedback from local communities, few internal controls, partially due to turnover of 
personnel, and weaknesses of the judicial system.  The Finnish respondents, however, 
emphasized the professionalism and morale of the Russian investigators in their own 
networks. Their often harsh physical conditions and strong professional identities were 
testified to in the Finnish descriptions of Russian Police working around the clock, 
using their private vehicles and phones.  
“When the Finnish police starts, the Russians carry on the task, often with a 
good work input.” 
“Work ethics and enthusiasm are impeccable in Russia.” 
“They act faster than in Finland, irrespective of whether the case is about 1kg or 
100g of drugs.” 
Trust between the Finnish and Russian authorities has developed as the professionalism 
and resources of the Russian police have been consolidated.  At the same time, this trust 
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was limited to personal networks. Consolidation seemed to be a double-edged sword. 
Paradoxically, corruption had increased because of positive structural developments.  
“Internal networks need to be evaluated continuously in Russia for the 
protection of information.” 
“In the international unit of the MVD only two persons stayed after the reform.” 
“In the 90s, the authorities were so weak [in Russia] that corruption was not 
needed. Now, because they are strong, corruption is used. In the 2000s, 
authorities have become more organized, they now do what they have to do.”  
“[In the 2000s Russian official] activities have become more professional and 
predictability has increased, we can talk about corruption openly.”  
The consolidation of the security administration is connected to both the stabilization of 
the Russian economy and the centralization in governmental decision-making.  
Centralization has not meant the end of unexpected changes, though. Previous studies 
have indicated that the more important a question is to Russian national security, the 
more centralized and more easily subject to change it is (Legvold, 2011: 24).  
“Developing the cooperation requires that the [Finnish] leadership has face-to-
face discussions with the [Russian] authorities.” 
“All liaison officers share the feeling that closedness and excessive bureaucracy 
have increased in recent years. 1998-2003 was still an open time; from then on 
centralization and control – among others on the part of the FSB – has 
increased.”  
The current professionally built local and regional networks are vulnerable to political 
changes. Finnish-Russian cooperation has been influenced by questions far outside the 
scope of crime investigation, such as high-profile politicized family law disputes 
between the Finnish and Russian authorities. Balancing international treaties with 
domestic laws can easily create misinterpretations. At worst, these can then be 
explained as proof of political opposition to cooperation in partner organizations. The 
Finnish-Russian case demonstrates that sustainability of cooperation requires looking 
far ahead in the future and also being able to re-evaluate current activities, while 
constantly keeping the dialogue going.  
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Conclusions 
Bilateral treaties have created a way in which to advance much needed practical goals. 
However, the ideal type of cooperation builds a ‘third administrative culture’ between 
partners. In such a culture, trust can be built on professional social capital (Bouckaert, 
2006), which is based on long-term commitment that continues to view cooperation as a 
mutual learning process. The case study, which we have presented as an example of 
bilateral relations, showed that cross-border cooperation is currently affected by 
disjointed and even competing multilateral and bilateral structures, differences in 
criminal law and procedure, gaps between international treaties and national legislation, 
local and regional variations of practices, and abrupt policy changes. If this picture is 
examined at the EU-Russia level, the challenges will be multiplied by various forms of 
law enforcement and legal systems in Europe.  
The position of the Finnish liaison officers in the current administrative environment is 
two-fold. On one hand, there is strong willingness to devote themselves to goal-
orientated practical action and develop better coordination across the border, which 
could potentially create a fertile environment for future development towards joint 
investigation teams. On the other hand, the motivation and ability of the Russian law 
enforcement organizations is often paralysed by central government policies and abrupt 
legal changes, which weaken organizational learning. The Finnish police leadership 
may not be committed to seeing the long-term benefits of learning processes which 
multicultural cooperation necessitates.    
The Finnish-Russian experiences are not unique or significantly different from the 
problems found with EU law enforcement cooperation or in international intelligence 
cooperation (Lefebre, 2003). Hämäläinen (2009) studied EU cooperation in police work 
and found similar challenges. Even though the structural development in Europe has 
advanced quite rapidly, legal-administrative cultures and politics have dominated over 
operative cooperation. The main difference between EU-wide law enforcement 
cooperation and collaboration with Russia seems to the strong effect of the Russian 
transformation. At the European level, lack of trust was related to work practices and 
cultural differences (Hämäläinen, 2009), whereas in collaboration with Russia, lack of 
trust remains institutional.  
Our results indicate that the effectiveness of cross-border networks between vastly 
different partners cannot be assessed strictly in terms of quantitative outcomes. Both  
legal differences and the administrative environment in Russia have significant effects 
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on the cooperation. In future developments, the core legal and administrative values also 
come into play.  As Harlow (2005) has pointed out the law represents a conception of 
government activities depending on certain type of rationality. From the Finnish 
perspective, the Russian legislation requires changes in the position and rights of the 
parties in criminal procedure. This seems unlikely at the moment, when Russia is 
seeking to strengthen its sovereignty.  
The current accent on national security in the Russian state management does not 
necessarily mean only obstacles for the future of cooperation. The framework of the 
National Security Strategy is specified in the Federative Law on Security (2010), which 
underlines the fact that national security is facilitated by better administrative 
coordination and development of the capacity of Russian authorities. One such area is 
the bilateral cooperation of the security authorities. Bilateral relations are also 
specifically mentioned as a venue for the advancement of Russia´s national interests in 
its Foreign Policy Concept (Kontsepsija vneshnei politiki Rossijskoi Federatsii 
12.2.2013).  The reform goals of the Russian government reflect, among other factors, 
such questions as economic efficiency and modernization of the work force, and the 
Europe-wide idea that a country´s internal security is strengthened by cross-border 
security cooperation. In this respect, the Russian understanding of national interests 
should also support the further development of cross-border cooperation.  
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